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INTRODUCTION
Many intellectual property practitioners associate the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) with its exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from federal district court decisions
involving patent law.  The Federal Circuit has, however, developed a
substantial body of trademark law as well.  In fact, the Federal Circuit
issued twelve decisions involving trademark issues in the year 2000
alone.1
A trademark issue can reach the Federal Circuit through a number
of channels.  The Federal Circuit will rule on a trademark issue that is
part of an appeal from a final decision of a federal district court when
the district court’s decision is determined in conjunction with claims
arising under the federal patent law.2  For example, when a party files
a complaint in a federal district court that is based at least in part on

1. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rendered ten precedential
decisions involving trademark issues in the year 2000:  Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d
1369, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. The Orvis
Co., Inc., 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Speedplay, Inc. v.
Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v.
M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Int’l Nutrition
Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,
229 F.3d 1080, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000); LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell
Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The court
also issued two unpublished decisions: Chatam Int’l Inc. v. UDV North America, Inc., 230
F.3d 1383, (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2000) (unpublished) and Sanders v. American Forests,
232 F.3d 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (unpublished).
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1) & 1338(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (including,
specifically, cases arising under an Act of Congress or unfair competition that
involves patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, mask works, designs, and
trademarks); see also LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
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patent issues, but also involves a non-patent issue such as trademark
infringement, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all issues presented in the complaint.3  In such appeals, the
Federal Circuit applies the trademark precedent of the circuit where
the district court is located.4  Of the twelve trademark decisions
reviewed by the Federal Circuit in the year 2000, three decisions were
appealed from federal district courts.5
A trademark issue may also reach the Federal Circuit on appeal
from a final decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB” or “the Board”) or the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (“the Commissioner”).6  An applicant for registration of
a mark, a party to a cancellation proceeding, or an applicant for
renewal of a registration, who is dissatisfied with the decision of
either the Commissioner or the Board, may appeal to the Federal
Circuit.7  The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over such appeals,
however, is not exclusive.  Although the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 295(a)(4)(B) provides that the Federal Circuit has “exclusive
jurisdiction” over an appeal from a decision of the Board or the
Commissioner, an applicant for a trademark who is dissatisfied with
the decision of the Board or the Commissioner may elect to appeal
the decision to a federal district court.8  The federal district court

3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of federal district
courts where the appealed case was based, either in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338, which governs, inter alia, trademarks).
4. See Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (noting
that “[i]n reviewing an issue not exclusive to patent law, this court applies the rule of
the regional circuit . . . .”).
5. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965 (appealed
from the District Court of Ohio); Speedplay, Inc., 211 F.3d at 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1984 (appealed from the Southern District Court of California); Cortland
Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734 (appealed from the
Northern District Court of New York).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Additionally, the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from, inter alia:  (1) final
decisions of the United States Claims Court; (2) final decisions of the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interference; and (3) final decisions of the United States Court
of International Trade.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(c) & 1295 (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  The other trademark
proceedings from which a party may appeal to the Federal Circuit include:  (1) a
party to an interference proceeding; (2) a party to an opposition proceeding; (3) a
party to an application to register as a lawful concurrent user; (4) a registrant who
has filed an affidavit as provided in Section 8 (§ 1058) of the Lanham Act; and (5) an
applicant for renewal, who is dissatisfied with the Board’s decision.  See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(4)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing the scope of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (a party seeking review
may elect to bring an appeal in U.S. District Court).
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then reviews the TTAB’s decision de novo.9  An appeal to the Federal
Circuit can only be made upon mutual consent of the parties.10
The TTAB determines only whether an applicant has a right to
federal registration of a trademark unlike the federal district courts
that can determine, inter alia, whether the use of a particular mark
constitutes infringement.11  Any opposition or cancellation
proceeding before the Board must be based on the mark as it appears
and as its goods or services are described in the
application/registration, and not on how the mark is actually used.12
In the year 2000, the Federal Circuit reviewed eight trademark
decisions issued by the Board.13
A trademark issue may also reach the Federal Circuit on appeal
from a decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of the United States
Court of Federal Claims.”14  In the year 2000, the Federal Circuit
reviewed one decision of the Court of Federal Claims involving
trademark and copyright law.15  Specifically, the Federal Circuit

9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (1994
& Supp. V 1999) (providing a right to appeal decisions made by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office regarding patent applications and patent interferences); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring the adverse
party to also file notice with the Director of the Board for the body where he or she
elects to pursue a case).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)  (“An appeal may be taken to the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board from any final decision of the examiner in
charge of the registration of marks upon the payment of the prescribed fee.”)
(emphasis added).
In every case of interference, opposition to registration, application to register
as a lawful concurrent user, or application to cancel the registration of a mark,
the Director shall give notice to all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board to determine and decide the respective rights of
registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1067(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 948, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846
(providing that in cases of conflicting marks, the determination of the rights as to
the use of the mark on a federal level is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
federal district courts).  See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1115, 1125 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)
(establishing trademark infringement and defenses); 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999) (establishing the original jurisdiction of federal courts of actions arising
under the Trademark Act).
13. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)  at 1894; Int’l Nutrition
Co., 220 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492; Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 943, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842; Jet, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854;
Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351; On-Line Careline,
Inc., 229 F.3d at 1080, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471; Chatam Int’l Inc., 230 F.3d at
1383; Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
15. See Boyle, 200 F.3d at 1369, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433 (assessing whether
the claim’s dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims was proper).
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examined whether the court appropriately dismissed a complaint
against the Federal Government for copyright infringement and
cancellation of a service mark.16
“Likelihood of confusion”17 and procedural issues, such as personal
jurisdiction and res judicata, comprised the dominant themes of the
Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions in the year 2000.  Half of the
cases appealed from the TTAB (four out of eight cases) were
affirmed.18  In contrast, the Federal Circuit affirmed one third of the
cases appealed from a federal district court (one out of three cases).19
In 2000, the Federal Circuit clarified that it will review the Board’s
factual findings under the “substantial evidence” standard.20
Previously, the Federal Circuit had reviewed these questions of fact
under the “clearly erroneous” standard.21  The Federal Circuit based
this decision on Dickinson v. Zurko,22 in which the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Circuit must review the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s (“PTO”) finding of facts according to one of the standards
set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).23
The Federal Circuit issued two nonprecedential, unpublished
decisions concerning trademark law in the year 2000.24  Although the

16. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433 (affirming the decision of the Court of
Federal Claims on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for direct
infringement, that the plaintiff contributorily infringed on his copyright, and that
the court did not possess jurisdiction).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 943, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842; On-Line
Careline, Inc., 229  F.3d at 1080, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471; Chatam Int’l Inc., 230
F.3d at 1383; Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907.
19. See Speedplay, Inc., 211 F.3d at 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1984 (affirming
the District Court’s opinion that patents for a clipless bicycle pedal and bicycle cleats
had not been infringed by a competing pedal system because there was no chance
that consumers would confuse the products).
20. See Recot, Inc, 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
21. See On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1084, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474
(noting that the Court previously reviewed questions of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard).
22. 527 U.S. 150, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930 (1999) (asserting that the Federal
Circuit should not apply the strict standard of “clearly erroneous” when reviewing
the PTO’s findings of fact, but rather should apply a less strict standard or review
pursuant to the APA because at the time of APA’s adoption, the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor applied a less strict standard).
23. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing a reviewing court to
overturn decisions of a federal agency when the decision was found to be an abuse of
discretion, contrary to a constitutional right, in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
ignorant of a procedure of law, backed by the weight of the evidence, or
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that a de novo review is necessary).
24. See Chatam Int’l Inc., 230 F.3d at 1383 (affirming the court’s opposition to the
trademark due to the likelihood of confusion was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence”); Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907
(affirming the Board’s decision that there was substantial evidence that appellant
lacked intent to use the mark in her individual capacity).
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Federal Circuit Local Rules distinguish between nonprecedential and
presidential opinions, and prohibit litigants from citing an
unpublished opinion as a precedent,25 intense debate over the value
of unpublished opinions was ignited by the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in Anastasoff v. United States.26  In Anastasoff, the Eighth Circuit
declared unconstitutional an Eighth Circuit local rule providing that
unpublished opinions are not precedent and should not be cited.27
In Anastasoff’s wake, the debate on the precedential value of
unpublished opinions in the Federal Circuit, and elsewhere, rages
on.28
In the year 2000, the Federal Circuit also clarified a number of
issues relating to both procedural and substantive trademark law.29

25. See FI CTAF Rule 47.6 and FI CTAF App. V, IOP 9.
26. 223 F.3d 898, 899, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1622 (8th Cir. 2000) (debating
the validity of Eighth Circuit Local Rule 28A(i)).  The rule provides that:
[u]npublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them.  When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any
unpublished opinion.  Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this
court if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no
published opinion of this or another court would serve as well . . . .
Id. at 899.
27. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (holding the rule
unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of legal precedent and would
expand judicial power beyond the guidelines articulated in Article III of the U.S.
Constitution).
28. See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Article III Judicial Power—Eighth Circuit Holds That
Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect.—Anastasoff  v. United States,
223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 940, 946 (2001) (arguing that the
justification of Anastasoff to unpublished works and legal precedent is based on the
shaky foundation of intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution and produces an
unclear aftermath despite the sound policy of the argument).  See also Giese v. Pierce
Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98, 103-04, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1810, 1813-14 (D. Mass.
1999) (equating unpublished cases with law review articles in terms of their
persuasive, but not mandatory, precedent).  Although the Giese decision came down
prior to Anastasoff, it raises the issue of the citing of unpublished opinions:
This Court recognizes that . . . an unpublished opinion is “not citable as
precedent” under Fed. Cir. Loc. R. 47.6(b).  This hardly means, however,
that it cannot be cited at all . . . .  At the same time [the unpublished
decisions] represent the considered opinions of sitting judges deciding
actual case . . . .  Moreover, where, as here, a body of law falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of only one federal circuit, the incremental worth of
any opinion—even one expressly designated as “unpublished”—is enhanced.
What, then, are the bar and the district courts to do?  Quite simply, take the
circuit rules at their word and, when an “unpublished opinion” is persuasive,
go ahead and cite it . . . not as precedent but as one would cite a law review
article by three respected authors.
Giese, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 104 n.1, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814 n.1.
29. See Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd., 220 F.3d 1325, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff distributor failed
to prove that the owner of a foreign trademark existed in privity with a second entity
who had previously opposed the plaintiff’s application to register the trademark in
the United States); see also Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 55
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I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
1. Application of the Res Judicata Doctrine
a. International Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research, Ltd.
In International Nutrition Company v. Horphag Research, Limited,30 the
Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the TTAB’s decision
dismissing a trademark cancellation petition based on res judicata.31
The Federal Circuit concluded there were insufficient factual
findings and legal conclusions to resolve the question of whether the
International Nutrition Company (“INC”) and Societe Civile Pour
L’Expansion de la Recherche en Phytochimie Appliquee (“SCERPA”)
were the same party or in privity for purposes of the cancellation
proceeding.32
Dr. Jack Masquelier, who researched sources for the substance
proanthocyanidins,33 controlled the French company Centre
d’Experimentation Pharmaceutique (“CEP”) which distributed and
marketed plant extracts for dietary and nutritional supplements.34  In
1989, Dr. Masquelier founded SCERPA, which registered the
trademark “PYCNOGENOLS” (with an “S”) in France that same
year.35
In 1971, Horphag36 entered into an agreement to act as an agent
for CEP for the U.S. sales of products made from plant extracts.37  In
1990, Horphag applied in the United States to register the trademark

U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that claim preclusion acts will act as a
hindrance to a second trademark action where there is a clear identity of the
plaintiffs, there has been a previous decision on the merits of the case which was
final, and there have been a common set of transactional facts).
30. 220 F.3d 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (denying
summary judgment on the reasoning that the reexamination of the patent unlawfully
broadened the scope of the claim, thus making invalid both the original claim and
the reexamination claim).
31. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
32. See id. at 1330, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (finding that privity would
support the application of res judicata).
33. See id. at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (describing proanthocyanids as
“specific complexes of biofavonoids . . . which are found in extracts of pine bark and
other plants” used as dietary and nutritional supplements).
34. See id. at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
35. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
36. See id. at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (identifying Horphag as a
distributor of dietary and nutritional supplements in the United States who applied
for trademark registration for their supplement PYCNOGENOL).
37. See id. at 1330, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495 (noting that Horphag was the
subject of the suite, replacing Interhorphag and Horphag Overseas Ltd.).
HAIGHTPP.DOC 11/9/2001  12:38 PM
1400 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1393
“PYCNOGENOL” to designate the source of proanthocyanidins,
substances found in certain plant extracts.38  The following year,
SCERPA filed an opposition to Horphag’s application alleging that its
predecessor had coined the term “PYCNOGENOL,” and that
companies affiliated with SCERPA had continuously used the mark in
association with the sale and distribution of dietary and nutritional
supplements in the United States since 1987.39  SCERPA further
argued that it had informed Horphag that it had no right to file or
pursue the registration of the trademark at issue, and that SCERPA
was the true owner of the mark.40  SCERPA also asserted that
Horphag had knowingly filed a false declaration claiming they were
the mark’s true owners.41
SCERPA abandoned the opposition before a decision on the
merits, and, in 1992, the opposition was dismissed with prejudice for
failure to prosecute.42  Horphag subsequently registered the mark
“PYCNOGENOL.”43
In 1994, SCERPA assigned the French registration for the mark
“PYCNOGENOLS” to INC, which owned, in its own name, the French
registration of “PYCNOGENOL” (without an “S”).44  INC sold its
products under the trademark “PYCNOGENOL” in countries other
than the United States, since Horphag owned the U.S. trademark
“PYCNOGENOL.”45
In 1997, INC filed a petition to cancel Horphag’s registration of
“PYCNOGENOL,” alleging that the trademark was fraudulently
obtained and that Horphag violated INC’s rights under the Paris
Convention.46  Horphag moved for summary judgment before
discovery based on the doctrine of res judicata.47  Horphag contended
that because SCERPA and INC were the same entity and INC was
SCERPA’s successor to the same property right at issue in the
opposition, the default judgment entered against SCERPA in the

38. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
39. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
40. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
41. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (averring that Horphag knew, through
its predecessors, of SCERPA’s registered trademark in France in 1989 as well as by its
wide sales in the United States dating back to July 1987).
42. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
43. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
44. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
45. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
46. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
47. See id. at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492; BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 546
(7th ed. 1999) (defining res judicata as:  (1) An issue that has been definitely settled
by judicial decision; or (2) An affirmative defense barring the same parties from
litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim).
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earlier opposition proceeding barred INC from now seeking
cancellation of Horphag’s mark.48  According to Horphag, INC was
bound by the default judgment entered against SCERPA in the
opposition proceeding.49  In response, INC filed a motion requesting
further discovery, which the Board denied on the grounds that the
issue of whether INC was precluded from bringing the cancellation
action based on res judicata was a question of law.50  After INC filed a
memorandum addressing the merits of Horphag’s motion, the Board
granted Horphag’s motion for summary judgment.51  The Board
concluded that INC was a successor in interest to SCERPA and should
be regarded as the same party involved in the opposition and
cancellation procedures for purposes of res judicata.52  Furthermore,
in finding res judicata, the Board concluded that the transactional
facts of both proceedings were the same, and that a final judgment
had previously been held against SCERPA in the opposition
proceeding.53  The Board accordingly dismissed the cancellation
proceeding.54
INC appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit, which
affirmed that default judgments can give rise to res judicata.55  The
court also determined that INC’s cancellation and SCERPA’s
opposition petitions involved the same claim since both proceedings
challenged Horphag’s eligibility to register “PYCNOGENOL” based
on alleged false declarations in Horphag’s application.56
The court held that when one party is a successor-in-interest to
another with respect to particular property, the parties are in privity
with respect to an adjudication of rights only in the transferred
property.57  The Court noted that the Board focused its decision on
the assignment from SCERPA to INC of the French trademark
“PYCNOGENOLS” in finding privity.58  This mark, however, was not
the subject of SCERPA’s opposition to the U.S. registration of
“PYCNOGENOL,” and it was also not the subject of the instant
cancellation proceeding.59  Instead, INC based its challenge on 15

48. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
49. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
50. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
51. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
52. See id. at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
53. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
54. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
55. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493.
56. See id. at 1328-29, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493-94.
57. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1493-94.
58. See id. at 1330, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
59. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
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U.S.C. § 106460 and on its interest in using the mark in the future to
market its products—not on its rights in France for
“PYCNOGENOLS.”61
The Court also concluded that the Board improperly focused its
privity analysis on INC’s statement that “it has rights in the same
trademark, through the same chain of title, as SCERPA asserted [in
the opposition].”62  First, in order for res judicata to be based on
successorship, the court reasoned that the Board’s decision would
have to be based on evidence that clearly indicated that INC obtained
its rights to the trademark directly or indirectly from SCERPA and
that it did so after SCERPA filed the opposition.63  Second, even if the
Board concluded that INC obtained its rights in the mark from
SCERPA after the unsuccessful opposition, that would not necessarily
bar INC from seeking cancellation on res judicata grounds.64
Cancellation of a trademark can be obtained under section 14 of the
Lanham Act by a party with no proprietary rights in the trademark at
issue.65  The court noted that, in case INC raised the theory that
Horphag’s claim of ownership of the PYCNOGENOL trademark was
false because SCERPA was the true owner of the mark, INC’s status of
successor to SCERPA to the trademark rights would be pertinent in
barring INC from seeking cancellation.66
As the court could not determine whether the origins of INC’s
rights would affect further proceedings on INC’s cancellation
proceeding, the court remanded the matter to the Board.67
b. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems
In Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems,68 the Federal Circuit once again
reviewed the Board’s application of the res judicata doctrine.  In this
case, the court reversed and remanded the TTAB’s dismissal of Jet,

60. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[a] petition to cancel a registration
for a mark . . . may . . . be filed . . . by any person who believes that he is or will be
damaged by the registration of the mark.”).
61. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 220 F.3d at 1330, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492.
62. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495.
63. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1495-96 (“For res judicata to be based on
succesorship, the Board would have to find that INC obtained its rights in the
trademark directly or indirectly from SCERPA and that it did so after the
unsuccessful opposition was filed”).
64. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
65. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d
1092, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
66. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
67. The court also left to the Board the task of determining whether INC may
seek cancellation pursuant to the Paris Convention and whether res judicata bars that
claim as well.
68. 223 F.3d 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Incorporated’s (“Jet”) petition for cancellation of Sewage Aeration
Systems’ (“SAS”) registered mark “AEROB-A-JET.”69
Both Jet and SAS manufacture sewage and waste-water treatment
devices for homes.70  Jet registered the marks “JET” and “JET
AERATION” in 1959 and 1969, respectively.71  In 1992, SAS registered
the mark “AEROB-A-JET.”72
In 1994, Jet filed suit against SAS in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio on grounds of trademark infringement.73
Subsequently, in 1996, Jet tried to amend its complaint by adding a
claim for the cancellation of SAS’ “AEROB-A-JET” trademark, only to
have the district court strike the requested amendment.74
Subsequently, Jet sought to cancel SAS’ registration of “AEROB-A-
JET” before the PTO.75
Meanwhile, the litigation between Jet and SAS proceeded in
district court, with Jet amending its complaint to assert infringement
only of the “JET” trademark, and not of the “JET AERATION” mark.76
As for the cancellation proceeding, where both the “JET” and “JET
AERATION” trademarks were at issue, the Board delayed the
proceeding until the infringement litigation was concluded, which
was ultimately decided in SAS’ favor.77  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
trial court’s finding of no “likelihood of confusion” between the
marks “JET” and “AEROB-A-JET.”78  Thereafter, the Board dismissed
Jet’s petition for cancellation of SAS’ trademark “AEROB-A-JET” on
res judicata grounds.79  Since the cancellation and litigation
proceedings involved the same claims, the Board prohibited Jet from
pursuing cancellation of “AEROB-A-JET” on the basis of either “JET”
or “JET AERATION.”80  Jet appealed the Board’s decision to the
Federal Circuit.81
The Federal Circuit articulated that claim preclusion will apply to
bar a second action where:  “(1) there is identity of the parties (or

69. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1361, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
70. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
71. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
72. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
73. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (claiming that the two companies’ marks
would easily be confused with one another).
74. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
75. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1361, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
76. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
77. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
78. See id. at 1362, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56 (stating that the likelihood of
confusion was almost non-existent due to the high degree of care that buyers
exhibited when purchasing the products).
79. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
80. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
81. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1361, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
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their privies); (2) there has been an earlier final judgment on the
merits of a claim; and (3) the second claim is based on the same set
of transactional facts.”82  Since the infringement litigation between
identical parties resulted in a valid final judgment on the merits, the
court determined that the issue rested only on whether the
transactional facts of the cancellation proceeding were the same as
those of the infringement proceeding.83  The court concluded that
transactional facts were different for the following reasons:
(1) infringement requires the plaintiff to have a valid registered
mark, while cancellation does not;
(2) infringement requires the defendant to have used the allegedly
infringing words or symbols in commerce and in connection with the
sale or promotion of goods or services, while cancellation requires
none of these;
(3) cancellation requires the respondent to hold a federally
registered mark, while infringement does not; and
(4) cancellation requires inquiry into the registrability of the
respondent’s mark, while infringement does not.84
Although both causes of action have the “likelihood of confusion”
analysis in common, the court noted that this commonality was not
sufficient to trigger claim preclusion.85  The Court clarified that, in a
“likelihood of confusion” analysis in an infringement context, the
analysis focuses on a comparison of the plaintiff’s registered mark
and the defendant’s use of symbols, words, etc.86  In a cancellation
proceeding, however, the analysis focuses on a comparison of the
respondent’s registered mark and a prior-registered trademark or
prior use by the petitioner of an unregistered mark that has resulted
in establishing a trade identity.87  The Court also noted that since the
litigation was based on the “JET” trademark, Jet still had a right to
proceed in the cancellation action based on its “JET AERATION”
mark.88

82. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) and Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 478-79, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
83. See id. at 1363, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856 (referring to the Restatement
(Second) on Judgments § 24 (1982), which states that a common set of transactional
facts must be defined as “core of operative facts” or “based on the same or nearly the
same factual allegations”).
84. See id. at 1364, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (holding that the “array of
differences in transactional facts” served to eliminate claim preclusion as a bar for
petition of cancellation).
85. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
86. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
87. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1364, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
88. See id. at 1365, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
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In reversing the Board’s dismissal, the court held that an earlier
trademark infringement action does not bar a later petition for
cancellation under the doctrine of claim preclusion.89  Upon remand,
however, the court advised the Board to consider whether issue
preclusion prevented further litigation before the Board related to
the question of “likelihood of confusion.”90  Thus, on remand, the
Board could examine whether the issue decided in the infringement
proceeding is sufficiently similar to the issue involved in the
cancellation proceeding so as to conclude that Jet should be
prohibited from relitigating the “likelihood of confusion” between
“JET” and “AEROB-A-JET.”91
Chief Judge Mayer dissented, stating that the Board properly
dismissed the cancellation petition on the basis of claim preclusion.92
Based on the policy of conserving judicial resources from the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)93 and on the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha,94
Chief Judge Mayer concluded that following the district court’s
denial of Jet’s motion to amend its original complaint by adding a
claim for cancellation of the “AEROB-A-JET” mark, Jet was precluded
from seeking cancellation in another forum.95

89. See id. at 1365, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858 (noting that the Board has ruled
similarly in at least two prior cases: (1) Treadwell’s Drifter’s Inc. v. Marshak, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1318, 1321 (TTAB 1990) (holding that claim preclusion did not
apply because the claim of injury arose from the use of the mark in commerce and
the other from the registration of the mark); and (2) Am. Hygenic Labs, Inc. v. Tiffany
& Co., 228 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 855, 857 (TTAB 1986) (ruling that claim preclusion
did not apply since injury in one instance was caused by the use of the mark whereas
injury in the second instance was caused by registration of the mark)).
90. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858 (certifying that the court in this case
used res judicata to refer to both claim and issue preclusion).
91. See id. at 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
92. See id. at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859 (reasoning that Jet’s cancellation
claim and infringement claim were brought under the same set of transitional facts,
and thus should be subject to claim preclusion in the interest of furthering the policy
goals, such as “conserving judicial resources and preventing multiplicity of suits,”
behind claim preclusion).
93. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860 (Mayer, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting the Restatement’s assertion that, “all actions arising from the
same transaction or series of transactions constitute a single claim for purposes of
claim preclusion”).
94. 58 F.3d 616, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that under
the principle of claim preclusion, “a party must raise in a single lawsuit all the
grounds of recovery arising from a single transaction or series of transactions that
can be brought together”).
95. See Jet Inc., 223 F.3d at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860.
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B. Appeals from Federal District Courts
1. Summary judgment: Cortland Line Co. v. The Orvis Co.
In Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co.96 the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York to grant summary judgment in favor of The
Orvis Company (“Orvis”) based on its fair use defense.97
The Cortland Line Company (“Cortland”), a fishing equipment
manufacturer, sued Orvis, its competitor, for patent infringement
and for infringement of its federally registered trademark,
“CASSETTE.”98  Orvis moved for summary judgment on Cortland’s
trademark claim based on the defenses of genericness and fair use.99
By granting summary judgment to Orvis based on its fair use of the
word “cassette,”100 the district court declined to reach the genericness
issue.101  Cortland appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.
Citing to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), the Federal Circuit noted that
“summary judgment requires the moving party to show both the
absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law.”102  The court also noted that, since the
trademark ruling was not exclusive to patent law, the court would
apply the rule of the regional circuit.103
After reviewing the relevant facts and applicable law, the court
concluded that Cortland raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the “CASSETTE” trademark is descriptive of characteristics
particular to both Cortland’s and Orvis’ products.104  The evidence
revealed that the industry used other terms, such as “spare,” “extra”
or “cartridge” spools prior to Cortland’s use of the term “cassette.”  In
addition, Cortland produced evidence of actual confusion, such as
customer inquiries and questions on electronic bulletin boards, and
raised the issue of whether Orvis used the mark in good faith.105  The
court also highlighted the fact that the district court itself noted in its

96. 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
97. See Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1360-62, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740-41.
98. See id. at 1355, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1736.
99. See id. at 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (establishing the fair use
defense).
101. See Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
102. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
103. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (citing Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia
Telecomms. Group, 900 F.2d 1536, 1548, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir.
1990) for the assertion that a court lacking exclusive appellate jurisdiction looks to
the law of the regional circuit where the district court sits).
104. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
105. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
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opinion that the frequency and context of Orvis’ use of the mark
were matters “of some debate.”106  Therefore, genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment based on fair use, and the
court consequently remanded the matter to the district court.107
In remanding for further proceedings on this issue, the Federal
Circuit stated that determining whether a trademark is generic is
relevant to the existence of an enforceable trademark.108  The court
accordingly directed the district court to consider Orvis’ fair use
defense.109
2. Personal jurisdiction
In LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc.,110 the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded the United States District Court of Ohio’s
determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant
corporation.
LSI Industries, Inc. (“LSI”), a manufacturer and vendor of lighting
products, claimed its competitor, Hubbell Lighting, Inc. (“Hubbell”),
infringed one of its design patents as well as its trademark rights.111  A
Connecticut corporation, Hubbell maintained its principal place of
business in Virginia.112  Although it employed multiple distributors in
Ohio, Hubbell had not sold any of its allegedly infringing products in
that state.113
After LSI filed a complaint against Hubbell in the U.S. District
Court of Ohio and sought a preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order, Hubbell moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue or for a change of venue.114  Due to
Hubbell’s substantial contacts with Ohio, the district court held that
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, it could
exercise general jurisdiction over Hubbell.115  The district court
concluded, however, that Hubbell’s sales activity did not meet the
requirements of Ohio’s long-arm statute because Hubbell did not sell

106. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (finding discrepancies in the parties’
characterization of the extent, emphasis, and effects of product descriptions as a
“cassette type reel” at marketing trade shows).
107. See Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
108. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
109. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
110. 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
111. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1370, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-66.
112. See id. at 1370, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
113. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
114. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
115. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (finding that Hubbell’s millions of
dollars in sales over several years and distribution network in Ohio satisfied the
standard for “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state).
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its allegedly infringing product in Ohio.116  As the locus of LSI’s injury
did not occur in Ohio, the district court granted Hubbell’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.117  LSI subsequently
appealed.
Initially the Federal Circuit noted that it would review the district
court’s decision de novo and apply its own law in analyzing personal
jurisdiction for purposes of compliance with federal due process
requirements.118  In contrast, the Federal Circuit stated that it would
defer to the state’s highest court when determining whether LSI is
amenable to process in Ohio.119
In order to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant, the district court must have found that:  (1) Hubbell
was amenable to process in the forum state; and (2) the court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Hubbell complied with federal
due process requirements.120  With respect to the first prong, the
court cited to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a defendant is amenable to service of process if it “could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state in which the district is located.”121  In Ohio, this prong is met
once the requirements established by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. are fulfilled.122  The Federal

116. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. Personal jurisdiction is proper under
Ohio law when a cause of action “aris[es] from [defendant’s] [c]ausing tortious
injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if [it] regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
state . . . .”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)(4) (West 2000).
117. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1370-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
118. See id. at 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (citing 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech
Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1376-77, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1773, 1775-76 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).  In 3D Sys., Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that Federal Circuit law
applies in the federal due process analysis when determining personal jurisdiction by
referring to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338(a), and 1367 (giving exclusive jurisdiction
over an appeal from a district court when that court’s jurisdiction is based at least in
part on a claim arising under patent law).  See 3D Sys., Inc., 160 F.3d at 1377, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
119. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (citing
Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) for the
proposition that federal courts are bound to accept the interpretation of state law by
the highest court of the state).
120. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
121. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)).
122. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 107 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1952)
(holding that the defendant, a foreign corporation with an office in Ohio, was
amenable to process in Ohio).  Where jurisdiction is not limited by state statute, an
action on a transitory clause may be heard by an Ohio court if it was brought by a
nonresident against a foreign corporation doing business in Ohio even if the cause
of the action did not arise in Ohio or related to the corporation’s business affairs in
Ohio.  See id. at 204.
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Circuit recognized the decision in Perkins and concluded that when
an out-of-state defendant conducts business in a “continuous and
systematic” way in Ohio, the defendant is “doing business” in the state
and is amenable to process there, even if the cause of action did not
arise from activity in Ohio.123
Turning to the Ohio long-arm statute, the court determined the
statute neither supplanted the Perkins decision nor expressly limited
Perkins.124  The court also noted that the Ohio Supreme Court applied
the Perkins doctrine without mention of the statute, even after the
Ohio legislature enacted the long-arm statute.125  The court
concluded the Perkins doctrine still applied, and that Hubbell, a
defendant conducting activity that meets the federal due process
threshold for general jurisdiction, was amenable to process under
Ohio’s “doing business” standard.126
As for the “minimum contacts” requirement, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Hubbell was amenable
to service of process in Ohio and had significant contacts with Ohio
for purposes of exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the Due Process
Clause.127  Noting that Hubbell sold millions of dollars of lighting
products in Ohio and had a wide distribution network in that state,
the court concluded that Hubbell met the standard of “continuous
and systematic” contacts.128  Thus, the Ohio court was determined to
have general jurisdiction over Hubbell under the Due Process
Clause.129  As Hubbell’s activities met both prongs of the personal
jurisdiction inquiry, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court’s decision.130

123. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
124. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
125. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (citing Wainscott v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio 1976) (involving an action taken against a
railroad company with offices in Ohio, but not real property, bank accounts, or
business-related functions taking place in Ohio, where the court differentiated
between “mere solicitation of business” and “doing business,” and ruled that
personal jurisdiction was not sanctioned because the railroad engaged in the
former).
126. See id. at 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
127. See id. at 1375, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
128. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
129. See LSI Indus., Inc., 232 F.3d at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
130. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
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C. Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims:131 Jurisdiction
Over Cancellation Claims
In Boyle v. United States,132 the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
In 1989, Mr. Boyle wrote a pamphlet describing “Moneyfor” mutual
fund products.133  He sent copies of this pamphlet to several money
managers, including a Wells Fargo executive.134  Several years later
Wells Fargo started to market similar products called “Lifepath”
funds, and in 1994 the PTO registered Wells Fargo’s use of
“LIFEPATH” and similar words.135  In 1997, Boyle registered his
pamphlet with the U.S. Copyright Office and, thereafter, brought suit
against Wells Fargo for copyright infringement.136  The Southern
District Court of New York determined that Wells Fargo did not
infringe Boyle’s copyright.137  At some point, Boyle wrote a letter to
the PTO requesting cancellation of Wells Fargo’s marks.138  Boyle
then filed a pro se complaint against the United States in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims, seeking cancellation of Wells Fargo’s
“LIFEPATH” trademarks, compensation for his injury, and injunctive
relief.139  Boyle alleged that the United States “wrongfully allowed”
Wells Fargo’s “LIFEPATH” service marks, failed to cancel them, and
“effectively destroyed” his copyright, which he claimed amounted to
an unjust taking.140  The court interpreted Boyle’s complaint to raise
as its main causes of action: (1) contributory copyright infringement;
and (2) a taking of his property without just compensation.141  The
court then granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, since the Federal
Government had not waived its sovereign immunity and thus could
not be held liable for copyright infringement.142  The court also

131. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final
decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1994
& Supp. V 1999).
132. 200 F.3d 1369, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
133. See Boyle, 200 F.3d at 1371, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434 (detailing Mr.
Boyle’s mutual fund products targeted to different maturity dates based upon the
year the investor desires the money).
134. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
135. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
136. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
137. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
138. See id. at 1371-72, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
139. See Boyle, 200 F.3d at 1372, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
140. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
141. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
142. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
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dismissed Boyle’s request for cancellation for lack of jurisdiction.143
Boyle subsequently appealed.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the Court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim and lack of jurisdiction de novo.144  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498,145 and in light of the requirement that the Federal
Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity be explicit,146 the court
agreed that Boyle had no claim against the government for Wells
Fargo’s acts.147  The Federal Circuit held that the PTO’s grant of a
service mark registration to Wells Fargo  constituted neither a
copyright infringement by the Federal Government, nor did it
constitute the Federal Government’s authorization and consent for
Wells Fargo to infringe Boyle’s copyright.148  As Boyle did not allege
that Wells Fargo’s “LIFEPATH” mark was used in his copyrighted
work, but rather that Wells Fargo stole the ideas from his copyrighted
work, the Court concluded that Boyle failed to state a claim for
copyright infringement.149  The court also clarified that the possession
of a service mark by one party does not deprive another party of any
rights the latter may have under the copyright laws.150  Thus, the
Federal Circuit held that: (1) Boyle failed to state a claim for direct
infringement and contributory infringement of his copyright;
(2) Boyle also failed to state that the government “took” his copyright
as matter of law; and (3) that Court of Federal Claims lacked
jurisdiction over ruling on Boyle’s request to cancel Wells Fargo’s
service marks.151

143. See id. at 1372, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
144. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
145. This statute provides:
Whenever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of
the United Sates shall be infringed by the United States, by a corporation
owned or controlled by the United Sates, or by a contractor, subcontractor,
or any person, firm or corporation acting for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, the exclusive remedy of the
owner of such copyright shall be by action against the United States in the
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of reasonable and entire
compensation as damages for such infringement . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
146. See Boyle, 200 F.3d at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435 (citing United States
v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976), which held that waivers cannot be implied).
147. See id. at 1372, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
148. See id. at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436 (reasoning that although the
grant of a service mark registration entitles the registrant to certain rights and
privileges under the Trademark Act, the right to infringe upon another’s copyright is
not one of those rights).  Since the federal government’s registration did not
authorize Wells Fargo to infringe upon Boyle’s copyright, there can be no claim
against the United States for Wells Fargo’s acts.  See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
149. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
150. See id. at 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
151. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. “Likelihood of Confusion”
1. Appeals from the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board
a. Consideration of the DuPont factors
i. Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton
In Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton,152 the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the Board’s determination that there existed no
“likelihood of confusion” between the marks “FRITO-LAY” and
“FIDO LAY” used for unrelated products.153  The court determined
that the Board erred by giving little weight to the fame of the
“FRITO-LAY” marks when it failed to consider all the relevant
evidence when analyzing whether the products were related, and by
improperly dissecting the marks.154
Recot owned six federal registrations for its “FRITO-LAY” mark, as
well as other related marks,155 under which Recot has manufactured
and sold various snack foods for more than thirty years.156  Five of
Recot’s marks are used in connection with snack foods, and one of its
marks is used with nonfood items, such as housewares, clothing, and
tote bags.157  Recot sells its “FRITO-LAY” products nationwide,
spending approximately $80 million in 1996 on advertising and
promotion for products with its mark.158  Becton sells natural dog
treats under the “FIDO LAY” mark in his pet food stores and
supermarkets in and around Birmingham, Alabama.159  Becton also
sells hats and t-shirts bearing the “FIDO LAY” mark.160  Becton has

152. 214 F.3d 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1994 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
153. See Recot, Inc. v. Becton, Opposition No. 96, 518, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1439, 1444
(T.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 1998) (concluding that FIDO LAY natural dog treats could not be
confused with FRITO LAY human snack foods because the goods were not identical
or otherwise related in nature).
154. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1325, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895 (finding that
famous marks should be afforded more preotection since they are more likely to be
remembered and may affect purchaser confusion, even if the products are
completely unrelated).
155. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
156. See id. at 1326, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (noting that Recot sells Frito-Lay
products throughout the United States in various stores and vending machines).
157. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
158. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
159. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
160. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1326, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
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sold approximately 800-1100 units of “FIDO LAY” products.161
In 1994, Becton applied for registration of its “FIDO LAY” mark,
and Recot opposed the registration on the ground of “likelihood of
confusion” with its “FRITO-LAY” marks.162  The Board dismissed
Recot’s opposition, finding no “likelihood of confusion” between the
marks, and concluding that the goods were not identical or even
related.163  The Board further concluded that, because the goods were
“so different in nature,” the fact that both goods were inexpensive
and could be bought on impulse were “diminished in importance.”164
As to the similarity of the marks, the Board deemed them sufficiently
dissimilar and unlikely to cause confusion.165  Although the Board
acknowledged the fame of the “FRITO-LAY” marks, it did not find
this “important” given the significant differences in the goods.166
Lastly, the Board found no evidence of bad faith by Becton in
adopting the “FIDO LAY” mark and Recot appealed the Board’s
decision to the Federal Circuit.167
Initially, the Federal Circuit noted that “likelihood of confusion” is
a question of law based on underlying factual determinations.168
Turning to the question of what standard of review it would apply to
the Board’s factual findings, the Federal Circuit clarified that it would
uphold the TTAB’s findings of fact unless they are unsupported by
substantial evidence.169  In so doing, the court cited the Supreme
Court decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, which held that the Federal
Circuit must review the PTO finding of facts according to either the
“arbitrary, capricious” or the “substantial evidence” standard of
review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).170  In

161. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
162. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
163. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
164. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (suggesting that a non-discriminating
customer should not be impulsively mistaken that a connection between the two
products exists because of the obviousness of their different nature).
165. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (noting that the Board failed to
separately examine the sound or appearance of the “FRITO-LAY” and “FIDO LAY”
marks).
166. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1326, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
167. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
168. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.  See also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:71-73 (4th ed. 2001)
(stating that most of the federal circuits hold that likelihood of confusion is an issue
of fact, governed by the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.  The Federal Circuit,
however, follows the minority rule that likelihood of confusion is a question of law).
169. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
170. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1937
(1999) (reversing the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision which held that the
appropriate standard of review of the PTO’s findings of fact was the clearly
erroneous standard).
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light of Zurko, the Federal Circuit recently concluded it would review
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (“BPAI”) findings of
fact under the “substantial evidence” standard.171  This standard,
which the court characterized as “less deferential” than the “arbitrary,
capricious” test,172 requires the court to consider whether a
reasonable person might find the evidentiary record to support the
agency’s conclusion.173  In Recot, Inc., the court extended application
of the “substantial evidence” standard to the review of factual findings
of the TTAB.174
The court then addressed the “likelihood of confusion” issues by
reciting the thirteen relevant factors articulated in In re E. I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co. (the “Dupont factors”).175  The court initially
addressed the “fame of the mark” factor and held that the Board
failed to accord proper weight to the fame of the “FRITO-LAY”
marks.176  The court stressed that when the “fame of the mark” factor
is present, it must be accorded full weight even if the “likelihood of

171. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).  The Federal Circuit decided In re Gartside approximately four months
prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Recot, Inc. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1330, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900.
172. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (citing Am.
Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412-13 n.7 (1983),
describing the arbitrary and capricious standard as “more lenient” than the
substantial evidence standard).
173. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (citing the Supreme Court’s description
of the substantial evidence standard in Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
174. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (supporting
their conclusion by citing Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165, and In re Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1315,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775).
175. See id. at 1326-27, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897; In re E. I. Dupont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The thirteen DuPont factors are:
(1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; (2) the
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use; (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels; (4) the conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i.e., “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated  purchasing; (5) the fame of
the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use); (6) the number and nature
of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature and extent of any
actual confusion; (8) the length of time during and conditions under which
there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) the
variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, “family”
mark, product mark); (10) the market interface between applicant and the
owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to which applicant has a right to
exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of potential
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial; and (13) any other
established fact probative of the effect of use.
In re E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 567.
176. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
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confusion” analysis is between marks that are used with goods that are
not closely related (as found by the Board).177  Thus, the court
rejected the Board’s rule that the fame of the “FRITO-LAY” marks
extended no further than the products with which the marks are
currently used.178  The court stated that:
We think that the Board’s rule—that the fame of the Frito-Lay marks
extends no further than the products with which the marks are
currently used—undercuts the legal standard of protection for
famous marks.  Famous marks are accorded more protection
precisely because they are more likely to be remembered and
associated in the public mind than a weaker mark.179
Indeed, while this factor cannot supercede the other DuPont
factors, it “demand[s] great vigilance on the part of a competitor who
is approaching a famous mark, for, as the present case illustrates, the
lure of undercutting or discounting the fame of a mark is especially
seductive.”180
As to the “relatedness of the goods” factor, the court determined
that the Board erred in declining to consider lay testimony of both
parties’ witnesses that several large companies produce and sell both
pet and human foods.181  Even if the goods are different, the court
stressed they nevertheless can be related in the mind of the
consuming public as to the origin of the goods.182  On remand, the
court directed the Board to consider all relevant evidence regarding
the “relatedness of goods” factor.183
Under the fourth DuPont factor, “the conditions under which, and
buyers to whom, sales are made,”184 the Federal Circuit held that,
contrary to the Board’s decision, consumers may confuse the origin
of inexpensive goods even if the goods themselves are different (i.e.,
dog versus human food).185  The court noted that the potential for

177. See id. at 1327-28, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
178. See id. at 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (“This court . . . [has]
consistently stated that fame of the mark is a dominant factor in the likelihood of
confusion analysis for a famous mark, independent of the consideration of the
relatedness of the good.”).
179. Id. at 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
180. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
181. See id. at 1328-29, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (noting that the Federal
Circuit found this testimony important in deciding whether a consumer would
reasonably consider FIDO LAY dog snacks and FRITO-LAY human snacks).
182. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1329, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (describing the
consumers’ reasonable belief regarding the relatedness of goods as a key component
of the likelihood of confusion analysis).
183. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
184. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
185. See id. at 1329, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899 (stipulating that when people
buy lower priced goods, the buyers’ risk of confusion increases as their standard of
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confusion involving inexpensive, impulse purchases is accentuated by
the presence of a famous mark.186
When considering the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks (the
first DuPont factor), the court stressed that the marks must be
analyzed in their entirety, with respect to sound, appearance and
connotation.187  Since the Board only considered the connotation of a
portion of the marks (“FRITO” versus “FIDO”) and concluded that
the marks were dissimilar, the Federal Circuit determined that the
Board improperly dissected the marks and failed to consider their
similar appearance and sound.188
However, the court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that Becton
acted in good faith when adopting “FIDO LAY,” and did not reach
the issue of whether evidence of intent to copy should give rise to a
presumption of “likelihood of confusion.”189  Lastly, the court agreed
with the Board’s determination that the goods were not sold in like
channels of trade.190  Even though both products are sold in
supermarkets, this finding is insufficient to deem the products
related.191  Absent some evidence that the products are sold in “close
proximity to one another,” the court discerned no error in the
Board’s conclusion.192  The court, however, vacated and remanded
the Board’s decision.193
ii. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.
In Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,194 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board’s decision to cancel the registration of the junior user’s
trademark,195 “LASERSWING,” on the ground of “likelihood of

care decreases).
186. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899 (describing impulse purchases of lower
priced goods as “hasty, economically painless, transactions”).
187. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
188. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1329-30, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899 (noting that
on remand, the Board must consider the marks’ appearances, sounds and
connotations before determining their similarity or dissimilarity).
189. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899-1900 (noting that Recot failed to
prove that Becton acted in bad faith).
190. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900 (clarifying that goods are not
sold in like channels unless they are sold in close proximity to each other in the same
forum).
191. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900 (noting that although the FRITO-LAY
and FIDO LAY products are both sold in supermarkets, there was no evidence
presented suggesting close proximity of the goods within the supermarkets).
192. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900.
193. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1900 (noting that the Board erred in
analyzing the fame of the FRITO-LAY mark and the relatedness of the products).
194. 222 F.3d at 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
195. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.1 (2d
ed. 1984) (defining the junior user of the trademark as the user who adopts and uses
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confusion.”196  The court held that the Board need not address in
detail each of the DuPont factors,197 but rather, must consider only the
factors for which evidence was presented for the record.198
Laser Golf Corporation (“Laser Golf”), the appellee and the senior
user and owner of the mark “LASER” for golf clubs and golf balls,
filed a petition to cancel Cunningham’s registration of the trademark
“LASERSWING.”199 The “LASERSWING” device resembles and
functions like a golf club and is used by golfers to practice and
improve their swing with the aid of light-emitting diodes contained in
the head.200  Since 1983, Laser Golf used the mark “LASER” to market
golf clubs and golf balls.201  Cunningham used the mark
“LASERSWING” to market his product since 1993.202  The Board
granted Laser Golf’s petition and cancelled the mark on the basis of
“likelihood of confusion.”203  Cunningham appealed, arguing that the
Board failed to consider certain evidence and all of the DuPont
factors204 as required by the decision in In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co.205
When analyzing the Board’s decision, the court noted it reviews the
Board’s legal conclusions, such as “likelihood of confusion,” without
deference.206  Further, the Federal Circuit noted that under its recent
decision in Recot, Inc. the court would review the Board’s underlying
factual findings for substantial evidence.207
The court then considered whether Laser Golf:  (1) had standing
to seek cancellation of Cunningham’s mark; and (2) had valid
grounds for requesting its cancellation.208  As to the issue of Laser
Golf’s standing, the court agreed with the Board that Laser Golf’s
senior user status and registration of the “LASER” mark established
its commercial interest in, and standing to seek, cancellation of

a mark after the senior user’s prior use of the same or similar mark).
196. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 944-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (stating
that the Lanham Act allows for cancellation of a Principal Register registration by a
party having standing and a valid ground for cancellation).
197. See supra note 175 (listing the Dupont factors).
198. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 947, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (dismissing
Cunningham’s argument that the Board erred by failing to consider nine of the
thirteen Dupont factors).
199. See id. at 944-45, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
200. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
201. See id. at 945, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
202. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
203. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
204. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 946, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
205. In re E. I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.3d at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 577 (noting that all thirteen factors must be examined in trademark cases).
206. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 945, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843-44.
207. See id. at 945, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
208. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
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“LASERSWING.”209  As to whether Laser Golf had a valid ground for
seeking cancellation, the court determined the “likelihood of
confusion” between “LASER” and “LASERSWING” under section
2(d) of the Lanham Act is a proper basis for seeking cancellation.210
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed with Cunningham’s
argument regarding the purported requirement that the Board
consider all thirteen DuPont factors.211  The obligation to consider a
DuPont factor arises only if there is evidence on the record relating to
a particular factor.212  The Board, therefore, is not required to address
each factor, but rather, it must analyze only those factors for which
relevant evidence is of record.213  As the court stated, “the obligation
to consider a factor does not arise in a vacuum and only arises if there
is evidence of record relating to that factor.”214  The court further
held that it is sufficient for the Board to give some indication that it
considered the Dupont factors for which the evidence is of record.215
The court proceeded to analyze only those DuPont factors for
which evidence was presented to the Board.216  As to the first DuPont
factor, comparison of the goods, Cunningham argued the Board
erred in failing to analyze the mark “LASERSWING” in its entirety,
and by focusing only on the common term “LASER.”217  The Federal
Circuit disagreed, stating the record demonstrated that the Board
properly considered the term “LASER” in its “likelihood of
confusion” analysis and properly analyzed Cunningham’s entire mark
“LASERSWING.”218
Next, the court agreed with Cunningham’s argument that the
Board did not specifically consider the sophistication of golfers when
analyzing the “conditions of sales” factor, but deemed this error
harmless.219  The court concluded that the alleged sophistication of

209. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844 (noting that Laser Golf has senior status
because it registered its mark before Cunningham registered his mark).
210. See id. at 946, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994
& Supp. V 1999) (providing that the “likelihood of confusion” between the mark
sought to be canceled and the mark for which the party can establish prior use or
registration is a valid ground because it would have prevented registration in the first
place).
211. See id. at 946-47, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
212. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 947, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
213. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
214. Id. at 946 (this paragraph omitted in 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)).
215. See id. at 947 (this paragraph omitted in 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)).
216. See id. at 947, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (analyzing Dupont factor
numbers one, three, four, five, seven, eight, ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen).  For a
detailed description of the Dupont factors, see supra note 175.
217. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 947, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
218. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
219. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
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golfers to distinguish between brands outweighed the Board’s
findings of identity of goods and similarity of the marks.220
The court proceeded to reject Cunningham’s arguments that the
Board failed to consider several other DuPont factors, such as the
absence of fame of the “LASER” mark, the lack of actual confusion,
the lack of market interface, the right of Cunningham to exclude,
and the lack of potential for confusion.221  The court concluded that
the Board: specifically discounted the fame of the “LASER” mark;
concluded no opportunity existed for actual confusion; properly
ignored the market interface factor due to lack of evidence; properly
considered the right to exclude by noting the presence of the
common term “LASER” in both marks; and specifically considered
the potential for confusion by noting that the relevant goods were
identical and that they traveled in the same channels of trade.222
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusion that the
relevant goods were identical because neither party limited the
products identified in the registrations to any particular channel of
trade or class of purchasers.223  Although Cunningham contended
that the Board failed to consider how the goods were sold in the
marketplace, the court emphasized that proceedings before the
Board are concerned with registrability, not with the use of mark.224
Although Cunningham argued the Board failed to consider
“evidence of use of the mark on the goods as another relevant
factor,” given his use of particular colors, font, and design, the court
found this argument “inapposite to its review of the record.”225
Registrations with typed drawings, such as “LASERSWING,” are not
limited to a specific rendition of the mark or a specific commercial
use.226  Thus, the Board correctly ignored Cunningham’s features in
reaching its decision.227
Thus, even if the Board failed to specifically consider a factor of
record, it would be a harmless error if, by weighing the factors, it still
would have found “likelihood of confusion.”228  The Federal Circuit
ruled that the Board sufficiently presented findings and committed

220. See id. at 948-49, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (characterizing golfers as
“meticulous purchasers who distinguish between brands”).
221. See id. at 949, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
222. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
223. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 950, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
224. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
225. Id. at 949, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
226. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
227. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
228. See id. at 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
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no reversible error.229
iii. Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.
In Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,230 the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the Board’s decision to sustain Hewlett-
Packard Company’s (“HP”) opposition to Packard Press,
Incorporated’s (“Packard”) registration of the service mark
“PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES.”  The court held that the Board, in
finding “likelihood of confusion,” erred when analyzing the similarity
of the marks and when leaving unclear the question of whether it
applied the correct legal test in determining the relatedness of the
goods.231
HP owns thirteen registrations for the mark “HEWLETT-
PACKARD” and related marks for many types of computer hardware
and software products.232  Additionally, two HP marks are registered
for data processing consulting services.233  Packard is a commercial
printing company concentrating on legal, municipal, and financial
printing, which also involves computer services to support its
commercial printing operations.234  Beginning in 1957, Packard
marketed its printing services under “PACKARD,” as well as other
related registered marks.235  In 1995, Packard filed an intent-to-use
application to register the service mark “PACKARD
TECHNOLOGIES” for data and information processing services, an
area of services in which Packard intended to expand.236
HP filed an opposition to Packard’s registration of “PACKARD
TECHNOLOGIES” under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act claiming
the mark was “confusingly similar” to HP’s “HEWLETT-PACKARD”
and related marks.237  The Board sustained the opposition and
determined that a “likelihood of confusion” existed between the
“HEWLETT-PACKARD” and “PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES”

229. See Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (affirming the
Board’s decision to cancel Cunningham’s “LASERSWING” mark).
230. Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1355, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
231. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
232. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (noting that such “HEWLETT
PACKARD” products include: computer hardware, software, data processing and
acquisition systems, computers, printers, printer accessories, fax machines, and
medical equipment).
233. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
234. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (defining financial printing as “printing
prospectuses, reports, and financial statements”).
235. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
236. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1355, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
237. See id. at 1356, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
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marks.238  By so finding, the Board concluded that the marks were
“identical or highly similar,” and that the goods and services were
related.239  Additionally, the Board determined that HP’s goods and
Packard’s services were marketed through the same channels of trade
and to the same classes of customers.240  The Board did not consider
the “fame” of HP’s marks because HP did not submit any evidence in
support of this factor.  Moreover, the Board neglected to consider
Packard’s evidence of the lack of actual confusion with the
concurrent use of its related mark “PACKARD” for computer
services.241  Packard appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal
Circuit.242
Citing its decision in Recot, Inc.,243 the Federal Circuit stated that it
would uphold the Board’s factual findings unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence.244  The Federal Circuit began
the review of the Board’s analysis of the DuPont factors by examining
the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks.245  The court held that the
Board improperly analyzed this DuPont factor when it considered
only the similar commercial impression of part of the marks—the
shared word “PACKARD”—when it should have considered the
appearance, sound, and connotation of the marks as a whole.246
Although the Board stated that it considered the marks in their
entireties, the Federal Circuit held that this statement, absent further
explanation, is insufficient to warrant proper review of the Board’s
fact finding.247  The court consequently vacated the Board’s decision
based on this DuPont factor and remanded the case for further fact
finding.248
Next, the court considered the “relatedness of the goods” factor.249
The court observed that Board correctly noted that while Packard’s

238. See id. at 1356, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353 (finding that the two marks
created similar commercial impressions and giving more weight to the word
PACKARD because “technologies” is highly suggestive and merely descriptive rather
than distinguishing the two marks).
239. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
240. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
241. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
242. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1355, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
243. Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
244. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1356, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
245. See id. at 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
246. See id. at 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
247. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354 (stating that the Board must explain its
decisions by providing clarification as to its underlying fact finding and analysis).
248. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
249. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354 (stating that “relatedness of the goods”
refers to the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration form).
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services and HP’s goods were in fact different, confusion may possibly
arise in the mind of the consuming public regarding the origin of the
goods and services.250  The Board concluded that, because HP’s goods
would be used with Packard’s services, these services were related to
HP’s goods.251  The Federal Circuit determined that the Board’s
conclusion was insufficient to allow itself adequately to review the
basis for the Board’s decision.252  Accordingly, the court was unclear
whether the Board based its conclusion on the incorrect proposition
that goods and services must be related if used together, or on the
correct proposition that goods and services can be related in the
mind of the consuming public as to their origin.253  Thus, the court
vacated the Board’s conclusion regarding the “relatedness of the
goods” and directed the Board to articulate its findings and
rationale.254
As to the “fame of the mark” factor, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the Board properly declined to consider this factor because HP
offered no evidence in support of its argument that its marks are
famous.255  HP did not argue in its appellate brief that the Board
erred in failing to treat its marks as famous.256  Its counsel, however,
asserted at oral argument that the Board should have taken judicial
notice of the fame of HP’s marks as the Federal Circuit had
previously done in a prior appeal from a Board decision.257  The
Federal Circuit distinguished this precedent because, unlike the
present case, where HP’s request for judicial notice was made only at
the oral argument, in the earlier case counsel requested judicial
notice in their briefs.258  The court observed that since the fame factor
is based on underlying factual findings, it requires the claimant to
submit the facts to the agency to create a record on which the agency

250. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1356, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354.
251. See id. at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354-55.
252. See id. at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355 (noting the written opinion of
the Board’s opinion offered only a “brief discussion . . . opaque as to the precise legal
standards applied” to the “relatedness of the goods” factor).
253. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355 (citing Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d
1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the relatedness that is pertinent
in the likelihood of confusion analysis is whether the consuming public believes that
the origins of the goods are related).
254. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
255. See id. at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
256. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
257. See id. at 1360, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (citing B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v.
Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1998) for the proposition that
courts may assume fame of a trademark by taking judicial notice of facts of universal
notoriety or facts generally known within their jurisdictions).
258. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
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can base its decision.259  Since HP failed to timely proffer evidence of
the fame of its marks in support of its argument, the court affirmed
the Board’s decision not to consider the fame factor.260
Under the analysis of the “similarity of the trade channels” and
“customer classes” factors, the Federal Circuit stressed that these
factors are determined from the registration application.261  When the
application does not contain limitations describing a particular
channel of trade or class of customer, the goods or services are
assumed to travel in all normal channels of trade.262  Since Packard’s
registration did not contain any restrictions as to particular classes of
consumers or channels of trade, the court found that the Board
properly concluded that the goods and services would travel in the
same channels and be available to the same customer classes.263
With respect to the Board’s evaluation of the eighth DuPont factor,
the length of time that the marks were concurrently used without
evidence of actual confusion, Packard argued that the Board’s failure
to consider its long-term use of the related mark “PACKARD”
resulted in no actual confusion.264  Like the Board’s analysis of the
“similarity of marks” factor, where the Board examined the common
use of the term “PACKARD” in isolation, Packard contended the
Board should have considered its concurrent use of “PACKARD” for
purposes of evaluating the eighth DuPont factor.265  The court
determined that this argument was moot in light of its prior
determination that the Board must consider the mark as a whole.266
Therefore, after weighing the relevant DuPont factors, the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision.267
iv. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America OnLine, Inc.
In On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,268  the Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s decision sustaining an opposition by America
Online, Inc. (“AOL”) against On-Line Careline, Inc.’s (“On-Line
Careline”) service mark based on “likelihood of confusion,” and

259. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356 (stating that the creation of a factual
record is heightened under the court’s more deferential standard for reviewing
agency fact finding because judicial review under the substantial evidence standard is
only possible when “the agency explains its decisions with precision”).
260. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
261. See id. at 1361, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
262. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
263. See Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1360, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1357.
264. See id. at 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
265. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
266. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355.
267. See id. at 1355, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
268. On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1080, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
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denying On-Line Careline’s petition to cancel AOL’s service mark.269
AOL, an Internet service provider, is marketed under the name
“CompuServe Information Service” (“CompuServe”).270  AOL
provides an electronic publication called “ONLINE TODAY” as part
of its informational services.271  In 1983, CompuServe first used the
mark “ONLINE TODAY” as the title of its printed magazine.272  In
1984, it used this mark in connection with the electronic version of its
printed magazine.273  Since 1990, CompuServe has used “ONLINE
TODAY” solely in connection with its electronic publication.274  In
November, 1995, the PTO issued CompuServe the registration for
the mark “ONLINE TODAY” for “providing access to online
computer services offering computer industry news, commentary,
and product reviews.”275
On-Line Careline, also an Internet service provider, is marketed
under the mark “ON-LINE TODAY,” and first used this mark
between late-1992 and early-1993.276  In 1993, On-Line Careline
sought to register the mark “ON-LINE TODAY” with the PTO for
“services in nature of interactive advice and counseling via computer
usage over telephone lines.”277  In February 1995, On-Line Careline
first sold its services under the mark “ON-LINE TODAY”.278
After the PTO published the mark in the Official Gazette279 in April
1995, CompuServe filed a timely opposition, arguing that it had prior
use of the mark and that consumers would likely confuse the two
marks.280  In May, 1996, On-Line Careline petitioned for cancellation
of CompuServe’s “ONLINE TODAY” mark, arguing that CompuServe
was not using its registered mark for the services set forth in the
registration and had therefore abandoned its mark.281

269. See id. at 1082, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
270. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
271. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
272. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
273. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471.
274. See On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1082, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
275. Id. at 1083, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
276. See id. at 1082, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
277. Id. at 1082-83, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
278. See id. at 1083, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
279. The Official Gazette is the official journal of the PTO.  Two journals are
published weekly, one concerning trademarks and concerning patents.  See United
States Patent and Trade Office: 2001 Products and Services Online Catalog, available
at www.uspto.gov/go/oeip.catalog/products/tmprod-2.htm#OGTM (last visited
Sept. 12, 2001).  The Official Gazette relating to trademarks includes information
about registered and canceled trademarks, trademarks published for opposition, and
PTO notices.  See id.
280. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
281. See On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1083, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
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In November, 1996, the two parties stipulated to an amendment of
the application and, in February, 1997, On-Line Careline filed a
Consented Agreement of Application with the Board in which it
sought to amend the identification of its services to “internet
access.”282  The Board denied the amendment without prejudice
because the term “Internet” was a registered mark and the amended
description of its services was indefinite.283  On-Line Careline further
amended the identification of its services to “[p]roviding
telecommunications connections to a global computer network in
International Class 38.”284  The Board granted On-Line Careline’s
motion to amend, with the provision that its mark be republished for
opposition if On-Line Careline was to prevail in its opposition.285
Meanwhile, CompuServe obtained a registration for the mark
“ONLINE TODAY” for “providing access to online computer services
offering computer-industry news, commentary and product reviews,”
which was issued seven months after the PTO sent On-Line Careline
its Notice of Publication.286  In May, 1996, On-Line Careline
petitioned to cancel CompuServe’s “ONLINE TODAY” mark,
claiming that it was using the mark in connection with “interactive
electronic communication of information, namely providing
information in the fields of financial, news, sports, weather and
general information and in providing round table discussions
whereby users communicate their opinions on topics and in
providing internet access,” and not in the manner set forth in the
registration.287
The Board held a hearing in May, 1998 with respect to the
opposition proceeding and determined that confusion between the
two marks was likely.288  The Board rejected On-Line Careline’s
argument that, because the purchasers of Internet services are
sophisticated, there was no “likelihood of confusion.”289  The Board
also rejected On-Line Careline’s argument that the absence of actual
confusion weighed in favor of its opposition, noting that the test is

282. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
283. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 (finding that the phrase “providing
internet access” was not sufficiently specific as to the services On-Line Careline
provided).
284. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
285. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
286. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
287. On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1083, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
288. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
289. See id. at 1083-84, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473 (noting that because
computer use is widespread in homes, schools and businesses, customers are not
always “knowledgeable enough to distinguish between the two marks and their
respective services”).
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not whether confusion has actually occurred, but whether confusion
is likely.290  The Board consequently denied registration of On-Line
Careline’s mark.291
In June, 1998, the Board denied On-Line Careline’s petition to
cancel AOL’s (which was substituted for CompuServe) “ONLINE
TODAY” mark,292 rejecting On-Line Careline’s argument that AOL
abandoned its registered mark by using it merely as a menu item and
not in the manner specified in the identification of services.293  On-
Line Careline appealed both of the Board’s decisions to the Federal
Circuit.
Initially, the Federal Circuit noted that the “likelihood of
confusion” issue was a question of law, which the court reviewed de
novo.294  In light of its recent decision in Recot, Inc.,295 which held that
the Board’s factual findings would be upheld “unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence,” the court inquired as to
whether a reasonable person might find the Board’s conclusions
supported by the evidentiary record.296
In analyzing the DuPont factors, the court noted that On-Line
Careline conceded the finding that “ONLINE TODAY” and “ON-
LINE TODAY” are similar in appearance, sound, and connotation.297
As for the “similarity or dissimilarity of the services” factor, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision.298  Although the
services are not exactly the same, the court concluded that it was
reasonable to believe that the general public would likely assume that
the origin of the services were the same, given the strong similarity of
the two marks.299
Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the “similarity of trade
channels” factor.300  The court determined that On-Line Careline
offered no evidence to support its contention that the two companies
market their services through different channels.301  In fact, the court
concluded that both companies offer their services through the same

290. See id. at 1084, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
291. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473.
292. See id. at 1084, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473-74.
293. See On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1080, 1084, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1474.
294. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474.
295. Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1322, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894.
296. See On-line Careline, Inc., 229 F.2d at 1085, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474-75.
297. See id. at 1086, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
298. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (finding that the Board’s conclusions
were supported by substantial evidence).
299. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
300. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475.
301. See id. at 1086-87, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
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channel—the Internet.302  Moreover, the record contained substantial
evidence that the two companies target similar consumers.303
After reviewing the Board’s findings on the remaining DuPont
factors, the Federal Circuit concluded that, in view of the substantial
evidence, the Board did not err in finding a “likelihood of confusion”
between the two marks.304  Specifically, the court rejected On-Line
Careline’s argument regarding the sophistication of Internet users,
and its claim that the lack of actual confusion prevented a finding of
“likelihood of confusion.”305  The court also rejected On-Line
Careline’s reliance on the fact that only AOL subscribers could access
the “ONLINE TODAY” content service and, therefore, would not be
confused as to the origin of those services.306
The Federal Circuit then addressed the issue of abandonment,
which is a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.307  Under
the Lanham Act, a registered mark may be canceled if it is
abandoned.308  A registered mark is considered abandoned if its use
has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.309  On-Line
Careline argued that AOL had abandoned the “ONLINE TODAY”
mark by not using it in connection with the services specified in the
registration (i.e., “providing access to online computer services
offering computer-industry news, commentary and product
reviews”).310  The court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that, because
AOL had provided its users with “access” to its service through on-
screen menu items, AOL had used the “ONLINE TODAY” mark in
accordance with the registration and, therefore, had not abandoned
the mark.311  The court concluded that substantial evidence existed to
the effect that: (1) AOL’s “ONLINE TODAY” service provided
computer-related news; (2) this information was accessed by users by
selecting the “ONLINE TODAY” mark, which was listed as a menu
item; and (3) the “ONLINE TODAY” mark was literally the
designation by which AOL provided users with access to the Internet

302. See On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1087, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
303. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
304. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
305. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
306. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
307. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that the court may infer
“intent not to resume” from the circumstances; however nonuse for three
consecutive years is prima facie evidence of abandonment).  “Use of a mark means
bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made
merely to reserve a right in a mark.”  Id.
310. On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1087-88, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476.
311. See id. at 1088, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77.
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news and related information services.312  Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board’s decisions.313
2. Appeal from the Federal District Courts: Trade dress infringement under
section 43 of the Lanham Act
In Speedplay, Inc  v. Bebop, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
determination of the District Court for Southern District of
California that Bebop, Inc. (“Bebop”) did not infringe Speedplay,
Inc.’s (“Speedplay”) trade dress.314  Speedplay sued Bebop for patent
and trade dress infringement of a clipless pedal and cleat used by
bicyclists.315  The district court denied Speedplay’s claims, concluding
that Speedplay proved that its product was distinctive, but failed to
prove that its product was nonfunctional or that there was an
existence of a “likelihood of confusion.”316
During Speedplay’s appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that, under
the applicable Ninth Circuit law, the plaintiff is “required to prove
that its trade dress is distinctive and nonfunctional, and that the
consumers are likely to confuse Bebop’s pedals with Speedplay’s
pedals.”317  In order to reverse the district court’s “likelihood of
confusion” determination, the Federal Circuit noted that the decision
must be “clearly erroneous,” the applicable Ninth Circuit standard of
review.318  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
products were sold in distinct markets and that, under the
circumstances, the district court properly afforded the “isolated
instances” of actual confusion little weight.319  The Federal Circuit
consequently upheld the district court’s decision.320
III. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
The Federal Circuit also issued two unpublished decisions
concerning trademark issues in the year 2000.  Pursuant to Federal
Circuit Local Rule 47.6, an opinion which is not published is “one
unanimously determined by the panel issuing it as not adding
significantly to the body of law.  Any opinion or order so designated

312. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476-77.
313. See id. at 1088, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1477.
314. Speedplay, Inc., 211 F.3d at 1258, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (holding that
the trial court’s ruling was not “clearly erroneous,” which was the applicable standard
of review in the Ninth Circuit).
315. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
316. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993.
317. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993.
318. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
319. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993-94.
320. See Speedplay, Inc., 211 F.3d at 1258, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
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must not be employed or cited as precedent . . . .”321
In the year 2000, Rule 47.6, as well as similar rules in other circuits,
came under attack.  For example, in Anastasoff v. United States,322 the
Eighth Circuit declared unconstitutional a local rule providing that
unpublished opinions have no precedential value and should not be
cited as precedent.323  The court noted that, while the court may
decide which opinions to publish, the opinions retain their
precedential effect regardless of publication status.324  Thus, the court
held that Article III incorporates the doctrine of precedent and the
judicially established rule barring citation of unpublished opinions is
therefore unconstitutional.325
Anastasoff concerned the timeliness of a refund claim for overpaid
federal income tax.326  Faye Anastasoff mailed her claim to the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) a few days before a three-year
limitation on the payment of refund claims expired, and the IRS
received it a few days after the three-year period had lapsed, making
part (but not all) of her claim untimely.327  Anastasoff claimed the IRS
“mailbox rule” rendered her entire claim timely.328  The district court
granted judgment in favor of the IRS on the ground that the mailbox
rule does not apply if any portion of the claim is timely.329  On appeal
to the Eighth Circuit, the court faced the following dilemma: in a
previous unpublished opinion, the court ruled that even if the
mailbox rule were applied in similar circumstances, other provisions

321. FI CTAF Rule 47.6 and FI CTAF App. V, IOP 9.
322. 223 F.3d 898, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en
banc, 253 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Anastasoff I and Anastasoff II,
respectively].
323. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the debate surrounding
the validity of Eighth Circuit Local Rule 28A(i)).
324. See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 899, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (holding that
Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i), which states that “unpublished opinions are not
precedent[,] is unconstitutional under Article III [of the U.S. Constitution], because
it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the ‘judicial’”).
325. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1627.
326. See id. at 899, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
327. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
328. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999).  This section states in relevant part:
[That subject to certain exceptions, if any] document required to be filed, or
payment required to be made . . . on or before a prescribed date under
authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is . . . delivered by
United States mail to the agency, officer, or office with which [the]
document is required to be filed, or payment is required to be made, the
date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in which [the]
document, or payment, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery
or the date of payment . . . .
26 U.S.C. § 7502 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
329. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
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of the Internal Revenue Code still barred payment of the claim;330
however, Anastasoff claimed that Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) denied
precedential effect to this opinion.331  The Anastasoff court held that
because Circuit Rule 28A(i) violated Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, the unpublished disposition must be accorded
precedential effect, requiring the panel to affirm the district court.332
In its decision the court stated that, “[i]nherent in every judicial
decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or
rule of law. . . .  This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent
necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases
to similarly situated parties.”333
Although the underlying tax refund issue in Anastasoff later
became moot,334 the debate on the precedential value of unpublished
opinions continues.335
A. “Likelihood of Confusion:”  Chatam Int’l Inc. v. UDV North Am.
In Chatam Int’l Inc. v. UDV North Am.,336 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board’s determination during an opposition proceeding that a
“likelihood of confusion” existed between the “GOLDSTRASSEN”
trademark sought to be registered by Chatam International, Inc.
(“Chatam”) and the senior mark, “GOLDSCHLAGER,” owned by
UDV North America (“UDV”).337
Chatam sought to register the mark “GOLDSTRASSEN” for a
liqueur.338  UDV, the senior owner and user of the federally registered
mark “GOLDSCHLAGER,” also a liqueur, filed an opposition to
Chatam’s trademark application.339  The Board sustained UDV’s
opposition based on “likelihood of confusion,” finding that UDV
held the senior mark, that the goods were “obviously identical,” that

330. See Anastasoff I, 223 F.3d at 899, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
331. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
332. See id. at 899, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
333. Id. at 899-900, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
334. Following the decision, Anastasoff filed a petition for rehearing en banc.  See
Anastasoff II, 235 F.3d at 1055.  In response to this petition, the IRS refunded the
taxpayer’s claim in full and announced the abandonment of its prior position
regarding the tax issue at bar, arguing that the case should be dismissed.  See id.  The
Eighth Circuit concluded en banc that the issue presented by Anastasoff I became
moot, and the question of the constitutionality of the rule denying precedential
effect to unpublished opinions remained open.  See id. at 1056.
335. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s decision to
hold Eight Circuit Local Rule 28A(i) unconstitutional because it violated the
doctrine of legal precedent and Article III of the U.S. Constitution).
336. 230 F.3d 1383, at 2000 WL 194122 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2000) (unpublished).
337. See Chatam Int’l Inc., 230 F.3d at 1383, 2000 WL 194122 at *1.
338. See id.
339. See id.
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the products would travel in the same channels of trade, and that the
marks were similar.340
Significantly, the Federal Circuit’s review of the Board’s
determination in Chatam preceded its decision in Recot, in which it
held that the Board’s factual finding would be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence.341  In Chatam, the Federal Circuit stated that its
determination of the applicable standard of review was bound by the
Supreme Court’s Zurko342 decision,343 which held that the scope of
review of PTO’s findings is subject to the standards set forth under
the APA—i.e., arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or substantial
evidence standard.344  The court noted that because the Board’s
finding of facts in this case would be upheld under any of the APA
standards of review, the court need not determine the specific
standard that it would apply.345
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board properly weighed
the DuPont factors in determining the existence of “likelihood of
confusion,” specifically, the close similarity of the goods (liqueur)
and channels of trade (bars/liquor stores).346  The court affirmed the
Board’s conclusion that, because the goods were the same, the
degree of similarity of the marks required was less in finding
“likelihood of confusion.”347  The Board concluded, and the Federal
Circuit ultimately agreed, that the marks were similar in appearance
and in sound (a combination of the same English and similar
German terms).348  The court also supported the Board’s analysis of
the composite marks without translating their German portions into
English, reasoning that many consumers may not be aware of the
English translation.349  The Federal Circuit, therefore, affirmed the
Board’s decision.350

340. See id.
341. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
342. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 150.
343. See Chatam Int’l Inc., 230 F.3d at 1383, 2000 WL 194122 at *1.
344. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152 (holding that the APA standard of review for
federal agency decisions applies to PTO decisions).
345. See Recot, Inc., 214 F.3d at 1327, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (noting that the
Federal Circuit later determined the specific standard of review for the Board’s
finding of facts).
346. See Chatam Int’l Inc., 230 F.3d at 1383, 2000 WL 194122 at *1.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
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B. Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act:  Sanders v. American Forests
In Sanders v. American Forests,351 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s conclusion that Sanders’ intent-to-use trademark application
was void ab initio.352
Barbara Sanders (“Sanders”), acting pro se, filed an intent-to-use
application pursuant to Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act,353 in which
she sought registration of the mark “LEAF RELEAF” and design
associated therewith to be used in conjunction with the “leaf-bagging
equipment” produced by her husband.354  Sanders filed the
application in her own name as an “individual.”355
In 1992, American Forest filed a notice of opposition against
Sanders’ application.356  American Forest is the owner of the service
marks “GLOBAL RELEAF” and “RELEAF,” which it licenses to
numerous companies to be used in connection with goods and
services promoting American Forests’ tree-planting projects.357
American Forest based its opposition on the potential for “likelihood
of confusion” between the marks, and because Sanders was not the
true owner of the mark, which made the application void ab initio
under Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act.358  In response, Sanders
asserted that she intended to use the mark in conjunction with her
husband’s leaf bagging product.359  She denied, however, that she and
her husband were partners in this enterprise.360
The Board determined that the application was void ab initio since
Sanders failed to present a bona fide intent to individually use the
trademark.361  The Board concluded Sanders intended only to use the
mark in conjunction with her husband’s product and to promote
their informal partnership, as opposed to using the mark as an
individual.362  The Board declined to address the “likelihood of
confusion” issue.363

351. 232 F.3d 907, at 2000 WL 274174 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) (unpublished).
352. See Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907, 2000 WL at *1; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1568 (7th ed. 1999) (defining void ab initio as “[n]ull from the beginning, as from the
first moment when a contract is entered into”).
353. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
354. See Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907, 2000 WL at *1.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. See Sanders, 232 F.3d at 907, 2000 WL at *1.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. (electing not to further consider whether there was a likelihood of
confusion between Sanders’ mark and the American Forest marks because the Board
had already determined that Sanders’ application was void ab initio).
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The Federal Circuit stated that, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1051, an
applicant must own the mark in order to register it.364  The court
noted that Sanders chose to file the application as an individual even
though she intended to use the mark in partnership with her
husband and his leaf-bagging product.365  The Federal Circuit
affirmed the Board’s conclusion that the true owner of the mark was
the partnership of Sanders and her husband, and, as a result, the
application could not have been filed by an individual.366
The Federal Circuit proceeded to consider Sanders’ assertion that
she should have been allowed to amend her application to reflect the
correct entity.367  The court rejected this argument, pointing out that
she did not provide the court with any authority to support her
position.368  Moreover, the court noted that, although the Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure § 1201.02(c) allows for the
correction of minor errors, the same section explicitly provides that
an applicant may not amend an application to set forth another
entity as the applicant.369
For the foregoing reasons, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Board correctly held the application void and sustained American
Forests’ opposition.370
CONCLUSION
Of the procedural and substantive decisions reviewed by the
Federal Circuit last year, the decisions of the Board fared better than
decisions by the Federal District Courts. While the Federal Circuit
affirmed half of the Board’s decisions, it only affirmed one-third of
the decisions of the Federal District Courts.
Last year, the Federal Circuit articulated the standard by which it
reviews the Board’s underlying factual findings in support of its
“likelihood of confusion” determinations.  In the Recot decision, the
Federal Circuit expressly adopted the substantial evidence standard
for the review of the Board’s factual findings. Articulation of more
deferential standard for reviewing agency fact finding heightens the
importance of the Board’s creation of a factual record.  As the
Federal Circuit explained in its Packard Press, Inc. decision, judicial

364. See id. at *2 (citing Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1202.01(b)
and Huang v. Tzu Wei Chen Food Co. Ltd., 849 F.2d 1458, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
365. See id.
366. See Sanders, 232 F.3d at 908, 2000 WL at *2.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id.
370. See id.
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review under the substantial evidence standard is only possible when
“the agency explains its decisions with precision.”371
Res judicata and “likelihood of confusion” issues dominated the
Federal Circuit’s trademark decisions in the year 2000.  The Federal
Circuit reversed the Board’s application of the res judicata doctrine on
two occasions,372 stressing the necessity to consider each element of
that defense.  In reviewing “likelihood of confusion” determinations,
the Federal Circuit held that DuPont did not require the Board to
consider all thirteen DuPont factors.  Rather, the Board is only
required to analyze those factors for which there was evidence of
record.  In Laser Golf, Cunningham and Hewlett-Packard, the Federal
Circuit highlighted the importance of analyzing the marks as a whole,
rather than examining each word in isolation, when weighing the
“similarity of the marks” factor.  In Recot, the Federal Circuit
emphasized the importance of considering the fame of the registered
mark.  The Federal Circuit’s decisions in the year 2000 added
substantively to its growing body of trademark law.

371. Packard Press, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1360.
372. See supra notes 31, 69 and accompanying text (providing that in each case,
the Federal Circuit remanded the TTAB’s decision to dismiss a trademark
cancellation provision proceeding).
